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Summary 
The improvement of irrigated agriculture needs sound performance assessment based on economic principles.  
This is particularly relevant to design adequate policies in terms of water allocation.  In this paper we endeavour 
to assess irrigation efficiency using a behavioural approach in which the cost function (shadow cost) is based on 
shadow prices of inputs.  This approach is useful to derive price distortion coefficients to indicate the level of 
allocative efficiency in two irrigated areas: Jendouba and Kairouan, in Tunisia.  Results show that in the case of 
Jendouba price ratio shows an even distribution around one with 50% of farmers having values below one and 
50% greater than one. In the case of Kairouan the same distribution is observed except that the magnitude of the 
distortion is greater (values around Two). This shows that inefficiencies are greater in Kairouan than in Jendouba. 
Such difference is explained by the prevalence of irrigation tradition which is older in Jendouba than in Kairouan.  
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1 Introduction 
Irrigation water has become increasingly scarce for agriculture. Past policies have been 
inclined to the development of water supplies to meet increasing demand for food. This has 
been accompanied by heavy costs to develop adequate irrigation infrastructure as well as 
important subsidies to encourage farmers to efficiently use irrigation water. These “water- 
supply» policies were not sufficient to guide efficient use of water in the absence of market 
oriented management policies. Nowadays it is recognized the need for performance assessment 
based on sound economic principles to design adequate policies in terms of water allocation. 
Institutions such as users’ irrigation associations were initiated to ensure better use and 
management of water. These institutions in turn are suffering from inherent agency costs and 
arising transaction costs that are inhibiting their role to enhance better performance of 
irrigation water use.  
Improving the performance of irrigation water use is achieved by better management and 
higher efficiency. In the literature, irrigation water efficiency has been defined on the basis of 
engineering concepts. Economists have been devoted to improving water use efficiency by 
assessing allocative or cost efficiency (Karagiannis et al., 2003 ; Omezzine and Zaibet, 1998). 
The latter concepts are related to market prices and look into optimal allocation of resources 
based on changing economic conditions. In this context the production structure (allowing for 
the possibilities of substitution among factors) and cost efficiency are useful tools to assess the 
performance of farmers.  
 In this paper we use a behavioural approach in which the cost function (shadow cost) is 
estimated based on shadow prices of inputs to derive farm specific indicators of allocative 
inefficiency. This research builds on models developed in Parikh et al. (1995), Reinhard and 
Thijsssen (2000), and Getachew and Sickles (2003). Factors that are presumed to affect the 
level of allocative efficiency are to be incorporated to explain the inefficiency error term. 
These variables include adoption of irrigation technology and irrigation management as well as 
other farm and farmers’ characteristics. We intend to derive useful information on the level of 
cost efficiency achieved by farmers as well as the economic behaviour in terms of the ability of 
farmers to react to changes in the economic conditions.  
 
2 Economic efficiency measures 
Let the technology relationship be represented by a cost function based on the composed error 
model (Aiger, Knox-Lovell, and schmidt): 
  ln C =  ∑+++ iiY y ωααα lnln0
+ ( ) ∑∑+ jiijYY y ωωγγ lnln21²ln21  
 +  Ly LiYi lnlnln γωγ +∑
 + ( ) ∑+ iLiLL LL ωγγ lnln²ln21  
 + iLQ yL εγ +lnln         (1) 
And 
iε = vi + ui 
C: total cost 
Y: total value of output 
wi : variable input i price  
L: land (area) to account for returns to scale 
The error term is composed into two independent elements where: 
vi : account for random variation in cost due to factors outside the farmer’s control (crop 
disease, whether, etc.),  
ui: reflects cost inefficiency 
 
Measurement of farm level inefficiency requires first the estimation of the error term U which 
requires the decomposition of ε  into its two individual components: U and V. Following 
Jondrow et al. (1982), the conditional mean of U given ε  is as follows:  
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=φ Standard normal density function (PDF) 
=Φ Standard normal distribution function (CDF) 
Determinants of cost inefficiency could be related to the nature of farming as well as 
socioeconomic and environmental factors: 
- When farming is characterized by subsistence crops, farmers may be prevented from 
reaching the efficiency frontier. The reason is that scarce resources are allocated based on their 
marginal shadow values instead of the marginal value productivities. Therefore, inefficiency 
may arise from these differences. 
- Non physical inputs such as experience, information and supervision might influence the 
ability of producer to use the available technology efficiently. 
- There are other factors that influence farmer’s efficiency such as land (farm) size, land 
tenure, credit availability, extension and education. 
- We are also particularly interested in irrigation management and technology, and related 
factor to explain inefficiency. 
In a two step procedure, cost inefficiency is regressed on the various explanatory variables that 
were identified: 
  C Ii = f(Zi)        (3)  
Where Zi= variables assumed to explain the level of inefficiency at each farm. 
 
3 Allocative efficiency: A shadow cost approach 
In current farming systems, the quantity of inputs used in particular water, is likely to differ 
from the cost-minimizing level of inputs and therefore shadow prices may deviate from market 
price, as suggested by Reinhard and Thijessen, (2000). In these situations, a shadow cost 
system is more adequate to reflect farm behavior instead of a standard cost system. 
A firm efficiency is decomposed into technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. A firm 
could be inefficient either by obtaining less than the maximum output available from a 
determined group of inputs (technically inefficient) or by not using the best package of inputs 
given their pieces and marginal productivities (allocative inefficient) (Murillo-Zamorano, 
2004 ; Kumbhakar et al., 1989). 
Using duality theory, the technology could be represented by the following (translog) cost 
system: 
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In a context where allocative inefficiency exists and the production function is homothetic, 
cε will represent the cost of both technical and allocative efficiency whereas cξ  will represent 
purely allocative efficiency. 
Assuming the most general case, a cost system that accounts for cost inefficiency could be 
written as (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004): 
 ( ) νω +++= ATyCC lnln,lnln  
 ( ) cii ySS εω += ,  
  ∑ = 1iS
Where lnT represent the increase in cost due to technical inefficiency, lnA the increase in cost 
due to allocative inefficiency, ν  is a statistical noise, and cε is the disturbance on the input 
shares equation which is a mix of allocative and technical inefficiency and noise. 
The shadow cost approach assumes that farms minimize shadow costs instead of actual cost. 
The standard neoclassical approach assuming minimum cost subject to an output constraint 
yields the first order conditions (FOC) as follows: 
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The FOC indicate that. the ratio of marginal rate of technical substitution is equal to the ratio of 
market prices for any two factors.  
Assuming however other constraints in the environment are added so that deviations in 
allocating inputs are introduced. In this case the above FOC becomes: 
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 Where w* represent shadow or effective prices with a deviation from actual prices captured by 
price distortionθ. (w*=θw).  
The shadow cost being function of w* instead of w, it could be proven using the duality theory 
(Shepard lemma) that the actual cost CA be defined in terms of the shadow cost C* as follows: 
( ) ,,, **** ∑=
j j
jR SqyCC θω  
where  
w*: a vector of shadow prices 
q : a vector of fixed inputs 
S* : the shadow cost share 
Figure 1 shows that farm B is technically efficient, but not allocatively efficient because the 
ratio of inputs is optimal for shadow prices ( )*ω  but not for actual prices ( )ω . 
Figure 1. Deviation of shadow prices from actual prices. 
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Let’s employ the translog shadow cost function as: 
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Where:  
*
iω  : the vector of shadow prices of the variable inputs (water, intermediate inputs), 
iy  : the output (value) 
iq  : a vector of (quasi) fixed inputs (labor, capital) 
The actual cost  will be as follows: RC
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AC  is the cost-efficiency costs  
ACwXS ii
A
i /=
θC  is the increase in cost due to allocative inefficiency. 
Price distortion coefficient θ could be modeled as a function of a set of variables that are 
assumed to explain price deviations.  
 
4 Estimation procedure 
A well behaved cost function should satisfy the homogeneity condition in factor prices. So we 
imposed the homogeneity condition as well as the usual symmetry conditions. Because the 
translog cost function has a large number of parameters then we need to estimate the cost 
function jointly with the cost share equation ( )*jS . This is suggested also because of the fact 
that the translog cost function is only an approximation of the true functional from so that a 
 
 valid analysis requires estimation of the cost function equation along the share equations. 
However, the cost shares sum to unity which requires that one cost share equation be omitted.  
Such condition imposed also that only relative price efficiency measures are identified. 
The LSQ (non linear least squares) procedure using TSP was used to estimate the cost system 
(the cost function along the input share equations). We also imposed the homogeneity and 
homotheticity restrictions on the parameters. The cost inefficiency parameters (θ i) are 
included and are assumed to be a linear function of explanatory variables: 
- Family labor vs hired labor 
- Transfers / off-farm income (OFI) 
- Farmer’ age (AGE) 
- Education and or experience (EDU) 
- Distance to market 
- Institutional factors (such as the case where a farmer belongs to a farmers’ association) 
- Subsistence needs vs market oriented 
- Technical variables such as irrigation system (IS) and water supply or source (WS) 
We tried these variables but only few variables were retained in the estimation because of the 
large number of parameters. Different specifications are used in the literature (exponential, 
linear or quadratic): in this study a linear function is estimated: 
OFIWSISEDUAge jijijijijjji 543210 εεεεεεθ +++++=  
We estimated first a restricted model (assuming θ  = 1) using a cost frontier and then we used 
the parameters as starting values in the shadow cost system. 
The data were collected over a cross section sample survey administered to 22 and 37 farmers 
respectively in Kairouan and Jendouba. A full description of the questionnaire and data 
construction is found in Bachta and Talbi (2005) and Boumediene (2005). As indicated above 
we estimated a short run cost function where labor (L) and capital (K) are held quasi-fixed for 
the period of study. We used an aggregated measure of output value since prices do not vary 
over farms.  Water (w) and variable intermediate inputs’ prices were derived from the survey 
on the basis of total expenses on these inputs.  
 
Table 1. Parameter Estimation of the cost system (restricted vs unrestricted) in the case of 
Kairouan 
Parameter / variable Restricted model  Unrestricted model 
A (intercept) .94 *    2.91*    
B1 : L .35 *    .30 *    
B2 : K .33 *    .77 *    
B3 : w -.069 *    -.63 *    
B11: LL .010 *  .057 *    
B22: KK .025 *  .116 *    
B33: WW -00.84  -.042*    
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 B12: LK  .014 *    -.015*    
B13: LW .018 * .526043E-03  
B23: KW .041 *    .013750 *    
C0: Y .238 *    -.159278    
CC: YY .0048 *  .113447  *  
C1: YL -.002  -.052780 *  
C2: YK .039 *  -.135121 *  
C3: YW .018 *    .228678  *  
L1 (constant term)  1.53997  *  
L2 (education)  .537257E-02  
L3 (irrigation system)  .265676  *  
L4 (age)  .848645E-02*  
L5 (water supply)  -.073389  *  
L6 (off farm income)  -.121293E-04*  
Log likelihood  419.7 411.871 
Convergence Achieved  
(N° Iterations) 
282 71 
 
Table 2. Parameters Estimation of the cost system (restricted vs unrestricted) in the case of 
Jendouba.  
Parameter / variable Restricted model Unrestricted model 
A (intercept) -2.92*    -.81    
B1 : L 1.27* .22*    
B2 : K 1.46* 1.27*    
B3 : w -0.18* -.21*  
B11: LL 0.02* .062*    
B22: KK 0.11* .10*    
B33: WW 0.81 .014*    
B12: LK  -0.12* -.01*  
B13: LW 0.04* -.029*  
B23: KW 0.01* .077*  
C0: Y 1.29* 1.24*  
CC: YY -0.03* -.053*  
C1: YL -0.05* -.091* 
C2: YK -0.09* -.02* 
C3: YW 0.03* .045* 
L1 (constant term)   .94* 
L2 (education)   -.06* 
L3 (irrigation system)   -.30* 
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 L4 (age)   .006* 
L5 (water supply)   -.103*  
L6 (off farm income)   .000016*  
Log likelihood  229.011 253.552 
Convergence Achieved  
(N° Iterations) 
618  720 
 
5. Interpretation and conclusions 
Estimation results are shown in Tables 1 and 2 respectively in the case of irrigated areas in 
Kairouan and Jendouba which are the two areas selected for this study. Most parameters are 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Convergence is achieved for all models 
(restricted and non restricted). It also appears that parameter estimates in the non restricted 
model are indeed different from those issued from the restricted model.  
The resulting price distortion coefficient is a measure of relative price efficiency. If θ  = 1 for 
input j then farmer is price-efficient in input use, while if 1≠θ  there exist price inefficiencies. 
Implications of price distortions could be interpreted in the following manner (which could be 
established on Figure 1):  
- θ  < 1 indicates the existence of relative price inefficiencies and overuse of the resource;  
- θ  > 1 means the existence of price distortions engendered by relative price inefficiencies 
and resources are under-utilized; 
Since price ratio = MRS between any two pairs of inputs, 1≠θ  indicates MRS exceeds the 
market price ration which could reveal the distortionary impact of factor pricing. 
Figure 2. Cost inefficiency parameter in the case of Jendouba. 
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 Figure 3. Price distortion coefficient for water in the case of Jendouba. 
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Figure 4. Price distortion coefficient in the case of Kairouan. 
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 Figure 5. Price distortion coefficient in the case of Kairouan. 
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Price distortion coefficients were evaluated based on the parameter estimates from the non 
restricted model. In the case of Jendouba this parameter shows an even distribution around one 
with 50% of farmers having values below one and 50% greater than one. In the case of 
Kairouan the same distribution but the magnitude of the distortion is greater (values around 
Two). This shows that inefficiencies are greater in Kairouan than in Jendouba. Such difference 
could be due to irrigation tradition which is older in Jendouba than in Kairouan. Factors 
presumed to explain such price distortion are presented in Tables 1 and 2. it appears that the off 
farm income and the source of water (private vs public) are significant factors in reducing the 
level of inefficiency in Kairouan, while education and irrigation technology are the significant 
factors in the case of Jendouba.  
 
Figure 6. Cost efficiency on the basis of the cost frontier.  
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 These results suggest that education and off-farm income along with the adoption of irrigation 
technology and private sources of water are significant factors that could contribute to improve 
the level of allocative efficiency observed in the case of irrigation water. These preliminary 
results would enlighten policy makers to foster policies oriented toward water management. 
Further research however is needed to improve the above estimation results by introducing 
technical efficiency measures in the cost shadow estimation procedure as well as deriving 
specific allocative efficiency measures for each farmer.  
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